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Abstract
We provide an introduction into the recent developments of dynamic mechanism design
with a primary focus on the quasilinear case. First, we describe socially optimal (or effi cient)
dynamic mechanisms. These mechanisms extend the well known Vickrey-Clark-Groves and
D’Aspremont-Gérard-Varet mechanisms to a dynamic environment. Second, we discuss re-
sults on revenue optimal mechanism. We cover models of sequential screening and revenue
maximizing auctions with dynamically changing bidder types. We also discuss models of
information management where the mechanism designer can control (at least partially) the
stochastic process governing the agent’s types. Third, we consider models with changing pop-
ulations of agents over time. This allows us to address new issues relating to the properties of
payment rules. After discussing related models with risk-averse agents, limited liability, and
different performance criteria for the mechanisms, we conclude by discussing a number of open
questions and challenges that remain for the theory of dynamic mechanism design.
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1 Introduction
In the analysis of economic environments in which information is dispersed amongst agents, the
paradigm of mechanism design has been developed to analyze questions of optimal information
collection and resource allocation. The aim of these models is to come up with a framework that
is suffi ciently flexible to treat applications in various fields of economics and precise enough to
yield concrete insights and predictions for the models. Over the last decade, the mechanism design
approach has been applied to a variety of dynamic settings. In this survey, we overview the basic
questions and modeling issues that arise when trying to extend the static paradigm to the dynamic
one. We do not aim at maximal generality of the results that we present but we try to bring about
the main ideas in the most natural settings where they arise.
By far the best understood setting for mechanism design is the one with independent private
values and quasilinear payoffs. Applications of this model cover models of negotiations, auctions,
regulation of public utilities, public goods provision, nonlinear pricing, and labor market contracting,
to name just a few. In this survey, we concentrate for the most part on this simplest setting. This
will in particular imply that we will not include a comprehensive review of the recent work on
dynamic taxation and dynamic public finance which has a strong focus on strictly concave rather
than quasilinear payoffs. However in Section 5, we shall provide connections between the two
classes of payoff environments and comment on the similarities and differences in the analysis and
the results.
It is well-known that in dynamic principal-agent models, private information held by the agent
leads to optimal long-term contracts that cannot be replicated by a sequence of short-term contracts.
We follow the literature on static mechanism design by allowing the principal to commit at the
beginning of the game to a contract that covers the entire length of the relationship. In our main
model with quasilinear utilities, private information and the desire to control the information rent
accruing to the agent is the only reason preventing the principal from ‘selling the project’to the
agent in the initial period.
Since we insist on full commitment power on part of the mechanism designer throughout this
survey, we will largely bypass the vast literature on Coasian bargaining that has the lack of com-
mitment at its heart. We will also not discuss in any detail the closely related literature on dynamic
games where the players may engage in interactions while their payoff relevant types are subject
to stochastic changes.1 The models that we cover sometimes feature a single allocation, and some-
1In repeated and dynamic games, the vector of continuation payoffs plays the role of monetary transfers in
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times repeated allocations over time. In all our applications, the types of some agents change in a
non-trivial manner across periods. For us, this is the distinguishing feature of dynamic mechanism
design.
The leading example for this survey is the problem of selling a given supply of goods over time
when the demand for the goods is realized over time. Special cases of problems within this class of
models include: (i) repeated sales when the buyer is uncertain about her future valuation for the
good or service; (ii) leasing a resource to a number of competing bidders that learn over time their
private value of the resource and (iii) selling (once and for all) an indivisible (durable) good to a
set of potential bidders whose types change over time.
For concreteness, let us describe the first of these settings in more detail and describe some of the
economic questions they pose. Leading examples here might be such common situations as member-
ships to clubs, such as fitness, or long-term contracts, such as mobile phone contracts or equipment
service contracts. At any given point in time the buyer knows how much she values the service, but
is uncertain about how future valuations for the service may evolve. From the point of view of the
service provider, the question then arises how to attract (and sort) the buyers with different current
and future valuations for his services. The menu of possible contract presumably has to allow the
buyers to express their private current willingness-to-pay as well as their expectation over future
willingness-to-pay. A variety of dynamic contracts are empirically documented, for example in gym
memberships and mobile phone contracts, as described in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) and
Grubb and Osborne (2015), respectively. These include (i) flat rates, in which the buyer only pays
a fixed fee regardless of her consumption; (ii) two-part-tariffs in which the buyer selects from a
menu of fixed fees and variable price per unit of consumption; and (iii) leasing contracts where
the length of the lease term is the object of choice for the consumer. In the subsequent survey we
will highlight how these and other features of empirically documented contract varieties may arise
as solutions to dynamic mechanism design problems.
The first section in this survey develops mechanisms that achieve a socially effi cient allocation
in these and many other models. For dynamic versions of the pivot mechanism, it is important
to keep track of the agents’marginal contributions to social welfare over time. In terms of the
examples above, the key is to compute the dynamic externalities imposed on other bidders when
the good is allocated to a given bidder.
For budget balanced mechanisms, the key is to find a way of balancing the payments of different
mechanism design problems.
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agents when their information over the distribution of future payments arrives at different times.
Balancing the budget in bilateral trading problems is more subtle than in the static case if the
parties learn their types at different points in the allocation game.
For the case of revenue maximizing mechanisms, one might guess that the part of private infor-
mation held by the bidders at the moment of contracting is the only source of information rent: the
rest of the stochastic process is uncertain to both the seller and the buyer, and after the initial report
the two parties share a common probability distribution on future types. This intuition has been
formalized by describing the additional information through a process of orthogonal information
and this insight forms a key part of the analysis of revenue maximizing dynamic mechanisms.
The key implications for the revenue maximizing allocation stem from this intuition. For most
stochastic processes (e.g. ergodic and strongly mixing processes), knowing the value of the process in
period t tells little about the value of the process in t+k for k large. Hence one might conjecture that
the private information θ0 held by the agent at the moment of signing the contract provides little
private information on the valuation θt for large t. Hence the reasons to distort the allocation for
large t in order to extract information rent from the agent at t = 0 vanish as t becomes large. Along
the revenue maximizing sales mechanism, allocations and trades converge to effi cient allocation
over time. The key to the analysis lies in finding an appropriate dynamic envelope formula to
express the necessary conditions of incentive compatibility for the agent. These conditions result
in dynamic virtual surplus formulas where the static Myersonian virtual surplus is modified by an
impulse response that measures the impact of first period private information on the future types.
With risk aversion and with limited liability, we add different reasons beyond private information
for continued contracting between the parties. Much less is known about the optimal solutions in
these cases. We outline the dynamic model under these alternative assumptions and discuss some
observations that follow from the Myersonian model. Incentives for local deviations, i.e. incentives
for reporting private information near the true type in our dynamic direct mechanism can still
be computed using a dynamic envelope theorem. The step of solving the relaxed program that
reflects these necessary incentive compatibility conditions is a lot more involved due to the lack of
quasilinearity. Unfortunately, the step of verifying full incentive compatibility is also a lot harder.
We divide the survey into three parts. The first part covers effi cient dynamic mechanisms.
This is the dynamic counterpart of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanisms and budget bal-
anced d’Aspremont-Gérard-Varet (AGV) mechanisms. We view this setting as the natural first
benchmark case for dynamic allocation models in the same way as the VCG mechanisms provide a
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natural benchmark for static problems. Examples of potential applications include effi cient dynamic
auctions, effi cient dynamic bilateral trade or bargaining, and dynamic public goods problems.
The second part deals with optimal dynamic mechanisms. The corresponding static models
here are the optimal screening models in a principal-agent setting and different models of selling
procedures such as auctions. Here we cover sequential screening and revenue maximizing auctions
with dynamically changing bidder types. We also discuss nonlinear pricing over time when the type
of the buyer changes stochastically. We also comment on the model of information management
where the mechanism designer can control (at least partially) the stochastic process governing the
agent’s types.
The third part considers models with changing populations of agents over time. Obviously
this part has no counterpart on the static side. It allows us to ask new questions relating to the
properties of the payment rules. For example with changing populations, it makes sense to require
that agents receive or make transfers only in the periods when they are alive. These restrictions
lead to interesting new findings about the models where effi cient outcomes can be achieved. We
discuss also some work on dynamic revenue management in this setting.
In the last substantive section of this survey, we consider briefly related models from public
finance and financial economics. The key departure in these models is the lack of quasi-linearity.
The models in dynamic public finance have concerns of consumption smoothing over risky outcomes
at their heart. Hence the models feature agents with strictly concave utilities in consumption and
leisure. In addition to the possibility of having risk-averse decision makers, the models in financial
economics often feature a limited liability constraint on the transfer rules: owners can pay the
managers but managers cannot be asked to make (arbitrarily large) payments to the owners. We
discuss the similarities in the analysis and contrast the results of these models with the models
under quasilinear utility. Finally, we make some connections to the rapidly growing literature on
mechanism design in computer science. Rather than concentrating on the properties of the optimal
mechanism for a fixed stochastic model, this literature takes as its objective the task of finding
mechanisms that guarantee a good payoff across a variety of different stochastic models.
While the target reader of this survey is an applied economist interested in learning about
the applicability of the mechanism design approach to dynamic incentive problems, we develop the
analytical arguments to some extent here and also comment on some theoretically subtle issues. The
interested reader will find complementary material and more technical detail in the recent textbooks
by Börgers (2015) and Gershkov and Moldovanu (2014), and earlier surveys focusing on dynamic
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auctions by Bergemann and Said (2011), and more recently by Pavan (2017). Bergemann and
Pavan (2015) provide an introduction into recent research in dynamic mechanism design collected
in a symposium issue of the Journal of Economic Theory.
2 Effi cient Dynamic Mechanisms
In this section, our aim is to extend the familiar Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanisms of static
mechanism design to a dynamic model. In line with the static model, we insist on private values,
independent types and quasilinear utilities. With these assumptions, effi cient (in the sense of
maximizing the gross social surplus) dynamic VCG mechanisms exist and they are the only ex post
incentive compatible effi cient mechanisms. With additional assumptions on the type sets, we can
demonstrate revenue equivalence results similar to those in the static model.
We start by setting up the general dynamic allocation problem that will be used throughout
this survey. We derive the dynamic counterpart to the static pivot mechanism and explain how the
dynamic mechanism succeeds in allocating each agent in the model her marginal contribution to
social welfare. We discuss then the dynamic version of the budget balanced dynamic d’Aspremont-
Gérard-Varet (AGV) mechanism of Athey and Segal (2013). Finally, we discuss extensions to
correlated and interdependent values respectively.
2.1 The Dynamic Allocation Problem
We consider an environment with private and independent values in a discrete-time, infinite-horizon
model. Agent i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I} gets flow utility in period t ∈ N that depends on the current physical
allocation xt ∈ Xt, the current monetary transfer pi,t ∈ R, and the type θi,t ∈ Θi. The Bernoulli
utility function ui of agent i is quasi-linear in the monetary transfer:
ui (xt, pi,t, θi,t) , vi (xt, θi,t)− pi,t.
We assume that the type θi,t of agent i follows a controlled Markov process on the state space Θi.
The type vector in period t is given by θt = (θ1,t, ..., θI,t) ∈ Θ, with Θ = ×Ii=1Θi. The set of feasible
allocations in t may depend on the vector of past allocations xt := (x0, ..., xt) as in a dynamic
auction of a single indivisible object.2
2In order to keep the notation manageable, we do not index Xt by xt.
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There is a common prior Fi (θi,0) regarding the initial type θi,0 of each agent i. The current type
θi,t and the current action xt define a probability distribution for the state variables θi,t+1 on Θi in
the next period. We assume that this distribution can be represented by a transition function (or
stochastic kernel)
Fi (θi,t+1 |θi,t, xt ) .
The utility functions ui (·) and the transition functions Fi are all common knowledge at t = 0.
The common prior Fi (θi,0) and the functions Fi (θi,t+1 |θi,t, xt ) are assumed to be independent across
agents. At the beginning of each period t, each agent i observes θi,t privately. At the end of each
period, an action xt ∈ X is chosen and payoffs for period t are realized. The asymmetric information
is therefore generated by the private observation of θi,t in each period t. We observe that by the
independence of the priors and the transition functions across i, the information of agent i, θi,t+1,
does not depend on θj,t for j 6= i. We assume that
|vi (x, θi)| < K,
for some K <∞ for all i, x and θi.
Since we do not want to introduce gains from trade through differences in intertemporal marginal
rates of substitution between the players, we assume that all agents discount the future with a
common discount factor δ, 0 < δ < 1. When discussing welfare, we adopt the point of view that
the mechanism designer has in period t a flow payoff given by




The socially effi cient policy is obtained by maximizing the expected discounted sum of valuations.
Notice that if the mechanism designer is not an actual player in the game, this definition of effi ciency
does not take into account budget deficits and surpluses.
Given the Markovian structure of the type processes, the socially optimal program starting in
period t at type vector θt can be written as:
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where we have defined
w (xs, θs) ,
I∑
i=0
vi (xs, θi,s) .
Notice that the dynamic dependence across the periods is now buried in the expectations operator.
Since the distribution of θi,t+1 depends on xt, the expectation over future types depends on the
current choice of x.
Alternatively, we can represent the social program in its recursive form:
W (θt) = max
xt
E {w (xt, θt) + δEW (θt+1)} .
s.t. θt+1 ∼ F (· |θt, xt )
The socially effi cient policy is denoted by x∗ = {x∗t}
∞
t=0 . The social externality cost of agent i is
determined by the social value in the absence of agent i:























, and w−i,t (xt, θt)
denotes the flow social welfare to the society where i has been excluded. The marginal contribution
Mi (θt) of agent i at signal θt is defined by:
Mi (θt) , W (θt)−W−i (θt) . (1)
The marginal contribution of agent i is the change in the social value due to the addition of agent
i. To fix ideas, we give a canonical example of a dynamic auction with uncertainty about future
values.
Example: Option Value and Irrevocable Allocation We consider the assignment of a single
indivisible object between two bidders i ∈ {1, 2} at a unique, and then irrevocable, time period
t. Thus the object can only be assigned once and only has value in a single period. The question
though is to whom should the object be allocated and in which time period. The allocation xt in
period t is a vector (x1,t, x2,t) with xi,t ∈ {0, 1}, where xi,t = 1 denotes allocating the object to i in
period t. The set of feasible allocations in period t is Xt = {(0, 1) , (1, 0), (0, 0)} if xs = (0, 0) for all
s < t. Otherwise xt = {(0, 0)}.
Bidder 1 has a constant value θ1,t = θ1 ∈ [0, 1] for the object for all t. By contrast, bidder 2
learns her value in period 1, and θ2,t ∈ {0, 1} for t > 0. Thus, there might be value of postponing
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the assignment decision until period 1, rather than assigning and consuming the object in period
0. The information that arrives in period 1 thus suggest that there might be an option value from
postponing the assignment until period 1. The private information of bidder 2 in period t = 0 is
the probability of having value 1 from period 1 onwards: θ2,0 = Pr{θ2,t = 1 for t > 0 |θ2,0}.
The payoff to bidder i from a feasible allocation is
∑
t δ
txi,tθi,t. In words, bidder i gets her
(expected) payoff of θi,t if she is allocated the good in t. We see immediately that
W−1 (θ1, θ2,t) = Pr{θ2,t = 1for t > 0 |θ2,t} = θ2,t
and
W−2 (θ1, θ2,t) = θ1.
To compute the effi cient, policy, we compare the payoff from immediate allocation to waiting until
t = 1 before allocating. Waiting yields social welfare
δEmax{θ1, θ2,0} = δ(θ2,0 + (1− θ2,0) θ1).




1− δ + δθ2,0
,
and to allocate immediately to 2 if
θ2,0 ≥
δθ1
1− δ + δθ1
.
If x∗i,0 = 1, then Mi (θ0) = θi,0 − θ−i,0 and M−i (θ0) = 0. If x∗1,0 = x∗2,0 = 0, then M1 (θ0) =
δ(θ2,0+(1− θ2,0) θ1)−θ2,0 andM2 (θ0) = δ(θ2,0+(1− θ2,0) θ1)−θ1. In this case, we can also compute
M1 (θ1) = max{θ1, θ2,1} − θ1, and M2 (θ1) = max{θ1, θ2,1} − θ2,1. The marginal contributions
beginning with period 1 coincide with the static marginal contributions.
2.1.1 Mechanism and Equilibrium
We focus attention on direct mechanisms which implement the socially effi cient policy x∗. In other
words, we seek a transfer rule that induces all the agents to report their type truthfully when the
physical allocation is given by the effi cient allocation rule given the reported types.
In the static case, the task is transparent. By the taxation principle, we can view the reporting
problem as an equivalent problem of letting each agent choose her most preferred allocation given
the reports of other agents. By promising each agent the entire social surplus from the effi cient
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choice given the reported types of other agents and her own true type, she has always the right
incentives to choose the effi cient allocation. In other words, she has a dominant strategy to report
her type truthfully in the direct mechanism. We shall see that some of the nice properties of
the static VCG mechanisms fail. Dynamic effi cient mechanisms will not in general be in dominant
strategies. Furthermore they are not detail free in the sense that details of the transition probabilities
Fi (θi,t |θi,t−1 , xt) matter for the effi cient choice of allocation in each t.
In a dynamic direct mechanism every agent i is asked to report her type θi,t in every period t.
We say that the dynamic direct mechanism is truthful if the reported type ri,t ∈ Θi coincides with
the true type for all i, t, θi,t. The dynamic revelation principle as stated in Myerson (1986) shows
that there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to direct mechanisms where the agents
report their information truthfully on the equilibrium path.
The mechanism designer chooses how much of the information in the reports and allocations
to disclose to the players. If xt = (x1,t, ..., xI,t) and vi (xt, θi,t) = vi (xi,t, θi,t) , for all i, t, then the
minimal information to disclose to player i would be xi,t. It is clear that restricting the information
available to agent i makes it easier to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints for that player.
In the current section, we can find effi cient mechanisms that satisfy very strong notions of incentive
compatibility and as a result, we assume that the entire vector of reports and allocations is disclosed
at each t.
With this assumption in place, the public history in period t is a sequence of reports and
allocations until period t − 1, or ht = (r0, x0, r1, x1, ...rt−1, xt−1), where each rs = (r1,s, ..., rI,s) is
a report profile of the I agents. The set of possible public histories in period t is denoted by
Ht. The sequence of reports by the agents is part of the public history and we assume that the
past reports of each agent are observable to all the agents. The private history of agent i in
period t consists of the public history and the sequence of private observations until period t, or
hi,t = (θi,0, r0, x0, θi,1, r1, x1, ..., θi,t−1, rt−1, xt−1, θi,t) . The set of possible private histories in period
t is denoted by Hi,t. An (effi cient) dynamic direct mechanism is given by a family of allocations




t : Θ → ∆ (Xt), and pt : Ht × Θ → RI . With the focus
on effi cient mechanisms, the allocation x∗t depends only on the current (reported) type rt ∈ Θ. In
contrast, the transfer pt may depend on the entire history of reports and actions.
A (pure) reporting strategy for agent i in period t is a mapping from the private history into the
type space: ri,t : Hi,t → Θi. For a given mechanism, the expected payoff of agent i from reporting
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∗ (rt) , θi,t)− pi (ht, rt)] .
Given the mechanism {x∗t , pt}
∞
t=0 and the reporting strategies r−i, the optimal strategy of bidder i
can be stated recursively:
Vi(hi,t) = max
ri,t∈Θi
E {vi (x∗t (ri,t, r−i,t) , θi,t)− pi (ht, ri,t, r−i,t) + δVi (hi,t+1)} .
The value function Vi (hi,t) expresses the continuation value of agent i given the current private
history hi,t. We say that a dynamic direct mechanism is interim incentive compatible, if for every
agent and every history, truthtelling is a best response given that all other agents report truthfully.
We say that the dynamic direct mechanism is periodic ex-post incentive compatible if truthtelling is
a best response regardless of the history and the current type of the other agents.
In the dynamic context, the notion of ex-post incentive compatibility is qualified by periodic
as it is ex-post with respect to all signals received until and including period t, but not ex-post
with respect to signals arriving after period t. The periodic qualification arises in the dynamic
environment as agent i may receive information at some later time s > t such that in retrospect
she would wish to change the allocation choice in t and hence her report in t.
2.1.2 Types, Allocations and Time Horizon
We have not said much about the interpretation of the types θi,t. Some authors separate two classes
of models: models with exogenous and endogenous types depending on whether the allocation
decisions have an impact on the distribution of future types. An example of exogenous types could
be a model of procuring goods from firms subject to autocorrelated privately observed cost shocks.
In this case, we could take θi,t ∈ R, with
θi,t+1 = γθi,t + εi,t+1,
where the εi,t are i.i.d. shocks.
An example of the second class of models, consider an employer who learns privately about the
(firm-specific) productivity ωi of a worker in periods when she employs the worker. In this case
it would be natural to take θi,t to be the probability distribution of the true productivity ωi. The
worker produces a output yi,t that is privately observed by the employee and distributed according
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to a c.d.f. G (· |ωi ) . The transition for the types, θi,t+1 is obtained from θi,t and yi,t by Bayes’rule.
For example in a normal learning model, the prior on ωi would be a normal random variable and
each yi,t is normally distributed with mean ωi and a known variance σ2. For the periods where the
worker is not employed, we have simply θi,t+1 = θi,t.
At the cost of some notational inconvenience, we could have allowed the payoffs and the tran-
sitions to depend on the full history of allocations: xt = (x0, ..., xt) . It will become clear that
none of the results would change as a result of this more general formulation. Hence we can easily
accommodate models of learning by doing, change for variety etc.
We can also accommodate the finite-horizon version of the model . This entails simply speci-
fying a certain transition at some T to an absorbing type vector θT with the understanding that
vi (x, θi,T+s) = 0 for all i, all s > 0 and all x ∈ X.
For the remainder of this section, we concentrate on particular effi cient mechanisms that have
further desirable properties. In the next subsection, we describe the dynamic pivot mechanism,
introduced in Bergemann and Välimäki (2010), that ensures that each agent’s payoff in the mech-
anism corresponds to her marginal contribution to the societal welfare as defined above after all
histories. In the dynamic pivot mechanism, all agents have the correct societal incentives to engage
in private investments in e.g. increasing their own payoffs through cost reducing investments. We
also consider the dynamic counterpart of the AGVmechanism where the focus shifts towards budget
balance. For dynamic bargaining processes and dynamic problems of public goods provision, these
considerations are of obvious importance just as they are in the static case.
2.2 The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism
We now construct the dynamic pivot mechanism for the general model described in Subsection 2.1.
The marginal contribution of agent i is her contribution to the social value. In the dynamic pivot
mechanism, we show that the marginal contribution will also be equal to the equilibrium payoff that
agent i can secure for herself along the socially effi cient allocation. If agent i receives her marginal
contribution in every continuation game of the mechanism, then she should receive theflow marginal
contribution mi (θt) in each period. The flow marginal contribution accrues incrementally over time
and is defined recursively:
Mi (θt) = mi (θt) + δEMi (θt+1) .
The flow marginal contribution can be expressed directly in terms of the social value functions,
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using the definition of the marginal contribution given in (1), as:
mi (θt) , W (θt)−W−i (θt)− δE [W (θt+1)−W−i (θt+1)] . (2)
The continuation payoffs of the social programs with and without i, respectively, may be governed
by different transition probabilities as the respective social decisions in period t, x∗t , x∗ (θt) and
x∗−i,t , x∗−i (θ−i,t), may differ. The expected continuation value of the socially optimal program,
conditional on current allocation xt and current state θt is:
W (θt+1 |xt, θt ) , EF (θt+1;xt,θt)W (θt+1) ,
where the transition from state θt to state θt+1 is controlled by the allocation xt. For notational
ease we omit the expectations operator E from the conditional expectation. We adopt the same
notation for the marginal contributions Mi (·) and the individual value functions Vi (·). The flow
marginal contribution mi (θt) is expressed as:
mi (θt) = w (x
∗






W−i (θt+1 |x∗t , θt )−W−i
(
θt+1
∣∣x∗−i,t, θt )] .
A monetary transfer p∗i (θt) such that the resulting flow net utility matches the flow marginal
contribution leads agent i to internalize her social externalities:
p∗i (θt) , vi (x∗t , θi,t)−mi (θt) . (3)
We refer to p∗i (θt) as the transfer of the dynamic pivot mechanism. The transfer p
∗
i (θt) depends
only on the current report θt and not on the entire public history ht. We can express p∗i (θt) in










∣∣x∗−i,t, θt )−W−i (θt+1 |x∗t , θt )] .
Notice that in contrast to the static transfer payment, the reported type of agent i has also an
indirect effect through δW−i (θt+1 |x∗t , θt ) . This reflects the intertemporal internalization of future
externalities that is necessary for aligning the incentives with the planner’s dynamic optimum. Given
that we started our construction from the requirement that each agent receives her full marginal
contribution W (θt)−W−i (θt) , we are obviously in the realm of (dynamic) VCG mechanisms.
Theorem 1 (Dynamic Pivot Mechanism)
The dynamic pivot mechanism {x∗t , p∗t}
∞
t=0 is ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational.
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In Bergemann and Välimäki (2010), we give conditions for the uniqueness of the above payment
rule. The dynamic pivot mechanism has properties that other VCG schemes do not necessarily
have. All payments are online in the sense that once an agent is irrelevant for future allocations,
she is not asked to make any payments. Furthermore the property of equating equilibrium payoffs
with marginal contributions gives the individual agents the socially correct incentives to engage in
privately costly investments in θi. For a class of dynamic auctions, Mierendorff (2013) develops a
dynamic Vickrey auction that satisfies a strong ex post individual rationality requirement.
We continue with the example from the previous subsection to illustrate how the payments in
the dynamic pivot mechanism are computed.
Example (Continued) For x∗i,0 = 1, we havemi (θ0) = θi,0−θ−i,0, and p∗i (θ0) = θ−i,0, p−i,0 (θ0) =
0. For x∗0 = (0, 0) we have mi (θ0) = − (1− δ) θ−i,0 and pi (θ0) = (1− δ) θ−i,0.
Hence we see that the dynamic pivot mechanism asks both bidders to make a positive payment
in period 0 if the good is not sold immediately. This reflects the delay externality that their inclusion
in the model imposes on the other party.
Since we have assumed independent types, additional assumptions on the connectedness of the
type spaces and payoff functions guarantee a dynamic revenue equivalence result. By imposing
an individual rationality or participation constraint for the agents, it is often possible to show as
in the static setting that the dynamic pivot mechanism results in the maximal monetary surplus
among all effi cient mechanisms. A negative surplus in the dynamic pivot mechanism then implies an
impossibility result mirroring the static Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem on budget balanced effi cient
dynamic mechanisms that satisfy incentive compatibility and individually rationality.
2.3 An Effi cient Dynamic Mechanism
One problem with the dynamic pivot mechanism is that just like its static counterpart, it does not
satisfy budget balance. To remedy this, Athey and Segal (2013) develop a dynamic version of the
AGV mechanism. The starting point for this construction is the dynamic team mechanism where
each agent’s individual payoff is augmented by a transfer that makes her total payoff equal to the
maximal social surplus in the model. This part of the construction follows along the familiar lines of
the static setting where the type vector θ is drawn for a single period. The static VCG mechanisms
take the form (x∗ (θ) , p (θ)) , where for all i and all θ, we have
pi (r) = −w−i (x∗ (ri, r−i) , r−i) + πi (r−i) ,
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where the second component of the transfer function, πi (r−i) is a term that for agent i only depends
on the reports of the other agents, r−i. In other words, the transfer of agent i depends on her own
announcement only through its impact on the other players’payoffs via the effi cient allocation rule.
By a simple application of the one-shot deviation principle, one sees that by setting
pi,t (ri,t, r−i,t) = −w−i (x∗ (ri,t, r−i,t) , r−i,t) ,
each agent responds optimally by announcing her type truthfully. This is not surprising: if future
announcements are truthful, each agent internalizes the social planners payoffs at all stages in the
game. Notice that since all players are receiving the entire social surplus here, this mechanism
provides the right answers for truthful reports even in the case of correlated types.
Obviously this mechanism does not satisfy budget balance. The AGV mechanism in the sta-
tic setting is constructed using the idea that by taking expectations over r−i in the expression
w−i (x





= Er−iw−i (x∗ (ri, r−i) , r−i) .
With this specification, the budget is clearly balanced and incentive compatibility holds in the sense
of Bayesian incentive compatibility.
For the dynamic mechanism, the construction is not quite as simple. Supposing that the incentive
payments are made as above based on the expectations over other players’types, but the realizations
of the other types become available before one’s own announcement, the simple AGV -mechanism
is no longer incentive compatible. In order to secure incentive compatibility, Athey and Segal (2013)
proceed as follows. Define
















pi,t (ri,t, r−i,t) = γ
i (ri,t+1, rt)− γi+1 (ri,t+1, rt) ,
the mechanism is obviously budget balanced.
The incentive payment γi (θi,t+1, θt) now reflects the expected change in W−i (conditional on
past announcements rt) that arises from the announcement θi,t+1. This cannot be manipulated by
players different from i in equilibrium. It should be noted that these mechanisms will not satisfy
individual rationality in general (since otherwise they would yield a contradiction to the Myerson-
Satterthwaite theorem). Dynamic AGV-like mechanisms have been used in e.g. the analysis of
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optimal allocation of sharing of the capacity in a joint project when information regarding future
profits arrives over time in Kurikbo, Lewis, Liu, and Song (2017).3
2.4 Interdependent Values and Correlation
Dynamic VCG mechanisms have been generalized to cover the case of correlated and interdepen-
dent values in Liu (2013). Correlation across agents allows for the use of dynamic versions of
mechanisms in the style of Cremer and McLean (1985), (1988). In a dynamic setting, it is possible
to use the intertemporal correlation of the reports of the agents and this allows for new types of
implementations of the effi cient allocation path.4 The paper also covers the case of interdependent
but independent values. For that case, it is well-known that effi cient mechanisms fail to exist in the
static setting (see e.g. Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001)). For the case
of single dimensional types and appropriate single crossing conditions for the agents’payoffs, Liu
(2013) develops a dynamic version of the generalized VCG mechanism.5
3 Optimal Dynamic Mechanisms
The analysis of the revenue-maximizing contract in an environment where the agent’s private in-
formation may change over time appears first in Baron and Besanko (1984). They consider a
two-period model of a regulator facing a monopolist with unknown, but in every period, constant
marginal cost. Besanko (1985) offers an extension to a finite horizon environment with a general
cost function, where the unknown parameter is either i.i.d. over time or follows a first-order autore-
gressive process. Since these early contributions, the literature has developed considerably in recent
years. Courty and Li (2000) consider the revenue-maximizing contract in a sequential screening
problem where the preferences of the buyer change over time but the allocation decision takes place
3In their particular problem, Kurikbo, Lewis, Liu, and Song (2017) find a version of the mechanism that can also
handle individual rationality constraints and incentives incentives for effi cent investments that affect other agents’
payoffs.
4The idea that we can strengthen the incentive constraints of current announcements by using future realizations
of correlated signals is reminiscent of the use of multiple signals in Deb and Mishra (2014) and Mezzetti (2004),
(2007).
5See Bergemann and Välimäki (2002) for the definition of the static generalized VCG mechanism for allocation
problems with single-dimensional types.
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only at a single point in time.6 Battaglini (2005) considers a quantity discriminating monopolist
who provides a menu of choices in each period to a consumer whose valuation can change over time
according to a commonly known Markov process with two states. In contrast to the earlier work, he
explicitly considers an infinite time horizon and shows that the distortion due to the initial private
information vanishes over time.
Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014) consider a general environment in an infinite horizon setting
and allowing for general allocation problems, encompassing the earlier literature (with continuous
type spaces). They obtain necessary conditions for incentive compatibility and present a variety
of suffi cient conditions for revenue-maximizing contracts for specific classes of environments. They
also observe the beneficial implications of time separable environments for a tighter characterization
of the optimal contract. Eső and Szentes (2017) and Li and Shi (2017) discuss the amount of
information rent that the optimal contract leaves to the agent. In particular, Eső and Szentes
(2017) show that under suitable restrictions on the implementability of the optimal allocation, the
agent gains no additional information rent from the new information that she gets after signing the
contract.
We start by recalling some notions from static optimal mechanisms. Our first dynamic model
deals with the simplest model of sequential screening as developed in Courty and Li (2000). We
review this material rather quickly since Chapter 11 by Krähmer and Strausz in Börgers (2015)
contains an excellent textbook overview of the material. Nevertheless, this material serves as a
useful preview of the issues that arise also in more complicated models. In order to make any
progress, we have to get some characterizations for incentive compatibility in the dynamic setting.
3.1 Preliminaries from Static Mechanism Design
Not surprisingly, we need to rely on tools that make the static mechanism design problem tractable:
the revenue equivalence theorem and single crossing properties of the objective function. Hence we
follow in the tradition that begun with the early contribution to the dynamic regulation problem
in Baron and Besanko (1984), Besanko (1985) and Riordan and Sappington (1987). In the static
principal-agent setting, a direct mechanism (x (θ) , p (θ)) is incentive compatible if for all types θ ∈ Θ
and all reports r ∈ Θ, we have
U (θ; θ) , v (x (θ) , θ)− p (θ) ≥ v (x (r) , θ)− p (r) , U (θ; r) ,
6Eső and Szentes (2007) rephrased the two period sequential screening problem by showing that the additional
signal arriving in period two can always be represented by a signal that is orthogonal to the signal in period one.
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and let
V (θ) , U (θ; θ) .
The envelope theorem by Milgrom and Segal (2002) gives the following necessary condition for
incentive compatibility in the case where the set of possible types is an interval of the real line:
Θ = [θ, θ].
Theorem 2 (Revenue Equivalence Theorem)
Assume that v (x, ·) is differentiable for all x ∈ X and that there exists a K < ∞ such that for all
x ∈ X and all θ,
|vθ (x, θ)| ≤ K.
Then V (θ) is absolutely continuous, V ′ (θ) = vθ (x(θ), θ) for almost every θ, and therefore
V (θ) = V (θ) +
∫ θ
θ
vθ (x(s), s) ds. (4)
This result is called revenue equivalence theorem because we can now pin down the transfers by
just determining the physical allocation x (θ) and the additive constant V (θ) :
p (θ) = v (x (θ) , θ)− V (θ)−
∫ θ
θ
vθ (x(s), s) ds. (5)
With the help of this necessary condition for implementability, we can rewrite the full incentive
compatibility requirement as the following integral monotonicity condition:∫ θ
r
(vθ (x (s) , s)− vθ (x (r) , s)) ds ≥ 0. (6)
Notice that this characterization of implementable allocations remains essentially unchanged even
if we allow for multidimensional allocations (these could correspond to the physical allocations of a
single-dimensional variable at different points in time).
In the static setting, with single dimensional types and single-dimensional allocations with payoff
functions satisfying strictly increasing differences, a full characterization of incentive compatibility
is immediate: A mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if the physical allocation is monotone
and the transfers are pinned down by the revenue equivalence theorem.7
7If v is twice differentiable, single crossing differences is equivalent to vxθ (x, θ) > 0 for all x, θ. Since∫ θ
r





(vxθ (y, s)− vθ (y, s)) dsdy,the claim follows.
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Unfortunately it is not possible to find an equally attractive characterization for incentive com-
patibility in the dynamic model. In some sense, this is not too surprising. After all, it is well-known
that characterizing incentive compatibility for models with multidimensional types (in this case,
consider the types across different periods) is very diffi cult. At the same time, the fact that only
the first period type is known to the agent at the moment of contracting lends additional structure
to the model and it is possible to make progress even in the absence of tight necessary and suffi cient
conditions for the set of implementable allocations..
A very rough protocol for solving dynamic mechanism design problems can be given as follows.
First, find the dynamic equivalent of the envelope formula (4) in the revenue equivalence theorem
to compute the transfers as a function of the allocation process. Second, consider the relaxed
principal’s problem where her payoff is maximized subject to the constraint that the transfer is
computed from (5). Third verify that the obtained solution satisfies the dynamic equivalent of the
full incentive compatibility requirement (6).
3.2 Sequential Screening
We illustrate the general procedure now with a version of the sequential screening problem first
investigated by Courty and Li (2000). An uninformed seller contracts with a privately informed
buyer for two periods t ∈ {0, 1} over the sale of a single indivisible good. At the beginning of the
game, i.e. in t = 0, the buyer has some preliminary information about the value of the product.
Let θ0 ∈ Θ0 = [θ0, θ0] be her type representing this information. Let F0 (θ0) denote the c.d.f. of the
prior information on θ0 and the corresponding density is denoted by f0 (θ0) . The buyer observes
additional information on her true valuation as time proceeds. To capture this, we let the private
information in period 1, θ1 ∈ Θ1 = [θ1, θ1], denote the buyers’true willingness to pay for the object.
This is without loss of generality since all information that can be considered in the allocation
decision arrives in periods. Hence we just denote by θ1 this total information available at the end
of the game.
A key part of the model is the assumed dependence of θ1 on θ0. If θ0 is interpreted as the initial
best estimate of the final θ1 then it is reasonable to assume that θ1 is increasing (in some sense)
in θ0. We assume here that this dependence is in the sense of first order stochastic dominance
(FOSD). To formalize this, we let F (θ1 |θ0 ) denote the conditional distribution of θ1 given θ0. Thus
we assume:
∂F (θ1 |θ0 )
∂θ0
≤ 0 for all θ0.
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Observe that









since Θ1 is the maximal support for θ1.
In order to apply the envelope theorem, we assume also that the conditional density f (θ1 |θ0 ) is
well defined, has full support, and that |∂f (θ1 |θ0 ) /∂θ0| is uniformly bounded on Θ0 ×Θ1. Notice
that F0 (θ0) and F (θ1 |θ0 ) induce jointly a distribution F1 (θ1) on Θ1.
It is crucial to keep in mind that the moment of contracting in this model is t = 0, and hence at
this stage θ1 is not known to the buyer or the seller. The seller could always use static mechanisms
based on either F0 (θ0) or F1 (θ1) . The point of the sequential screening model is to show how
the seller can do better than either of these alternatives. The idea is that the seller must leave
information rent from the initial θ0 to the buyer. The allocation can be made more effi cient by
using the information contained in θ1. If this effi ciency gain can be realized without increasing the
information rent to the buyer, then the seller gains relative to the two static alternatives. The model
of sequential screening shows how this can be accomplished through a menu of option contracts.
Since we have defined θ1 to be the true value of the object to the buyer, the simplest model of
sales induces preferences over the probability of sales x and transfers p from the buyer to the seller
as follows:
uS (θ1, x, p) = p,
uB (θ1, x, p) = θ1x− p.
Dynamic Direct Mechanisms and Incentive Compatibility
For this two period model we can then define a direct dynamic mechanisms as follows.
Definition 1 (Direct Dynamic Mechanism)
A direct dynamic mechanism is a pair of functions,
x : Θ0 ×Θ1 → [0, 1],
p : Θ0 ×Θ1 → R+.
As in the example in the previous section, the buyer reports her type in each of the two periods.
In the first, her report depends on her type θ0 and in the second, it can depend on θ0, r0 and on θ1.
The dynamic revelation principle by Myerson (1986) can be invoked to show that there is no loss
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of generality in concentrating on direct mechanisms where truthtelling is optimal on equilibrium
path.8
We write
u (θ0, θ1) = θ1x (θ0, θ1)− p (θ0, θ1)
for the final realized utility (or ex post utility), and
U (θ0; r0) =
∫
Θ1
u (r0, θ1) f (θ1 |θ0 ) dθ1
for the expected utility evaluated at the interim stage after period 0 reports. As in the static case,
we let
V (θ0) = U (θ0; θ0) .
Ex-post incentive compatibility then requires that for all reports r1 in period t = 1,
u (θ0, θ1) ≥ θ1x (θ0, r1)− p (θ0, r1) .
Interim incentive compatibility requires that for all r0,
V (θ0) ≥ U (θ0; r0) .
We say that the mechanism is interim individually rational if for all θ0,
V (θ0) ≥ 0.
3.2.1 Characterizing Incentive Compatible Mechanisms
We first present a useful characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms. The best case sce-
nario would obviously be a result that gives an if and only if characterization for incentive compatible
direct dynamic mechanisms. In the static case, with single dimensional types, such a characteriza-
tion could be obtained under the additional assumption of payoffs that satisfy the Spence-Mirrlees
single crossing condition. Recall that in this case, global incentive compatibility is equivalent to
local incentive compatibility (or envelope formula) together with the monotonicity of the allocation
rule in type.
In the current sales model, single crossing is clearly satisfied. We have also assumed that the
types across the two periods are linked in the FOSD ordering. Hence there is a lot more structure
8In the current setting, it is also relatively easy to show that whenever truthful revelation of types is optimal on
equilibrium path, it is also optimal off equilibrium path.
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in place than for the static two-dimensional screening problem where little is known about the
characterization of incentive compatibility. One should also bear in mind the simplifications that
come from the sequential reporting structure.
We start with the easy part. For period t = 1, the first period report θ0 is fixed and hence the
incentive compatibility for reporting θ1 reduces to the static incentive compatibility conditions.
Proposition 1 (Ex Post Incentive Compatibility)






2. Transfers are pinned down by the allocation and the payoff of the lowest type.
3. (Monotonicity) x(θ0, θ1) is non-decreasing in θ1 for all θ0, θ1.
One might hope that a similar proposition would hold for reporting the type θ0. Unfortunately
this is not the case. Since the interim reports induce lotteries of payoffs (depending on the realization
of θ1), the static proof where incentive compatibility implies monotonicity fails (since now a similar
monotonicity only needs to hold in expectation).9 While we will not get an if and only if statement
for incentive compatibility, the envelope formula remains valid. Furthermore, monotonicity of the
allocation rule is suffi cient for full incentive compatibility. This means that the solution to the
relaxed problem is the optimal mechanism if the allocation rule is monotone in both components.
Proposition 2 (Interim Revenue Equivalence)
In any incentive compatible direct dynamic mechanism:
1. (Envelope Theorem) For almost all θ0, we have:




∂F (θ1 |θ0 )
∂θ0
dθ1. (7)
2. Transfers are pinned down by the allocation and the payoff of the lowest type.
9Krähmer and Strausz (2017) construct an equivalent static problem to each sequential screening problem of the
above type.
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3. Suppose that x(θ0, θ1) is increasing in both components. Then there exists a transfer scheme
p(θ0, θ1) such that the direct dynamic mechanism (x, p) is incentive compatible.
Notice the factor ∂F (θ1 |θ0 ) /∂θ0 in the first part of the proposition. It measures the impact of
the first period type on the distribution of the second period type. Understanding how the initial
type effects the information rents of the subsequent types is the key for all revenue maximizing
dynamic mechanism design models. The second part in this proposition is just housekeeping. It is
a result of the fact that the interim utilities can be evaluated by the envelope formula and directly
through expected values from getting the object net of expected payment. Notice also that the first
part implies immediately that any incentive compatible mechanism is individually rational if and
only if V (θ0) ≥ 0.
3.2.2 Determining the Optimal Selling Mechanism
The next step is to determine the optimal mechanism. As in the static case, we express the payoff


















]x(θ0, θ1)f(θ1|θ0)f(θ0)dθ1dθ0 − V (θ0).
But now the solution of the relaxed problem where we ignore the global incentive compatibility
constraints is close. Since we are using the Envelope formulas in computing the buyers’equilibrium
payoff, we are making sure that the local incentive compatibility constraints hold. Clearly it is
optimal to make the individual rationality constraint binding and set
V (θ0) = 0.
Define a modified virtual value ψ(θ0, θ1) by







This modifies the classic Myersonian virtual value by multiplying the information rent component
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measuring the impact of θ0 on the distribution of θ1.
Since the value of the integral is linear in x, it is clearly optimal to set x(θ0, θ1) = 1 whenever
ψ(θ0, θ1) ≥ 0 in the relaxed program. If ψ(θ0, θ1) is strictly increasing in both components, then
this solution solves the revenue maximization problem. Hence we assume from now on that ψ is
increasing in both arguments. To complete the description of the optimal mechanism, define the
following function
q(θ0) = min{θ1 ∈ Θ1|ψ(θ0, θ1) ≥ 0}.
Since ψ is increasing, q (·) is well defined. With the help of this function, we can characterize the
optimal selling mechanisms.
Theorem 3 (Optimal Screening Mechanism)
If ψ(θ0, θ1) is increasing in both arguments, then a direct dynamic mechanism (x, t) maximizes the
seller’s expected profit in the class of incentive compatible mechanisms if and only if
x(θ0, θ1) = I{θ1≥q(θ0)},
and the transfer is computed from the envelope formula.
Can we think of a nice indirect mechanism that implements this mechanism? We can consider
option contracts for selling the good. In such a contract, the buyer buys for an up-front fee p(θ0)
the option of purchasing the good at strike price q(θ0). Hence the mechanism seems to bear some
relation to contracts that are actually observed in situations where uncertainty is gradually resolved
and revealed about the value of the alternatives. Let {p (θ0) , q (θ0)}θ0∈Θ0 denote the implementation
of the optimal trading mechanism by these option contracts.
3.2.3 Information Rent and Orthogonalization
Eső and Szentes (2007) propose the following alternative way of approaching the problem. Rather
than observing θ1, they let the buyer observe the percentile:
γ , F (θ1|θ0).
Notice that γ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] for all θ0 and thus γ is independent of θ0.This allows
us to think of γ as the new information relative to θ0 that is contained in θ1 and the new variable
γ is called the orthogonalized signal.10
10The use of orthogonalized signals also makes the analysis of the more complicated models of Pavan, Segal, and
Toikka (2014) and Eső and Szentes (2017) more tractable.
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The orthogonalized model allows for an easy comparison to the case where the seller also observes
the orthogonalized signal. This is a useful benchmark that separates the initial private information
from future realizations of symmetrically observed uncertainty. If the optimal allocation rule in
the benchmark model satisfies monotonicity with respect to the orthogonal signal, the two models
result in the same optimal mechanism. It should be noted though that the transfers implementing
the optimal allocation can be quite different in the two models.
The orthogonalization procedure can also be used to see that the seller is always better off
releasing the new information θ1 rather than not releasing it. Li and Shi (2017) adds a word of
caution regarding the use of this observation for general information management by the seller.
They construct an example where the seller can achieve a higher expected revenue by showing a
garbled version of θ1. Bergemann and Wambach (2015) extend the model of information design to
consider sequential information release by the seller.
An important aspect in the argument of Eső and Szentes (2007) is that the choice of information
disclosure is given directly in terms of the orthogonal information itself. Li and Shi (2017) show
that if the information disclosure can be made contingent upon the realization of the initial private
information, then the principal can frequently strictly improve his payoff by disclosing information
only partially, and through a policy that is contingent upon the initial information θ0.
3.2.4 Multiple Buyers: Handicap Auctions
An early extension of the sequential screening model to cover multiple agents is the handicap auction
in Eső and Szentes (2007). The model still has a single allocation stage and two reporting stages,
but it allows for the presence of multiple bidders. Letting θ0 ∈ Θ0 and θ1 ∈ Θ1 denote the vectors
of independent private value types θit ∈ Θit of bidder i in t, we can then write a dynamic direct
mechanism (x, p) as:
x : Θ0 ×Θ1 → ∆N ,
p : Θ0 ×Θ1 → RN ,




∈ RN+ |Σixi ≤ 1} is the set of possible allocations The interpretation is
























stand for the expected allocations and transfers of agent i. Thus, it is assumed that players other
than player i report truthful their type when computing X i (·) and P i (·).
Similar to the static case, the analysis of incentive compatibility and revenue equivalence that













. Hence we do not repeat the steps but go directly to the formula for


































































To maximize this expected revenue without violating the interim individual rationality con-




= 0 for all i, and to use the allocation rule:














}, for all j;
0, if otherwise.
The associated transfers can be computed from the envelope formula and binding participation
constraint of the lowest type bidder.
3.3 Optimal Dynamic Mechanism
We now describe how the insights from the sequential screening environment can be extended to
many periods and many allocations. We will be skipping a large number of details and for those
we often refer the reader to Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014). We focus again mainly on the single
agent case and consider a general discrete time horizon, t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T} with T ≤ ∞.
We use the general dynamic model outlined in Section 2.1 with regularity assumptions that allow





At the moment of contracting in t = 0, the agent knows θ0, and the stochastic process Ft (θt+1 |θt, xt )
governing {θt}t>0 but not the realizations θt for t > 0. The prior distribution on Θ0 is given by
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F (θ0) . We continue to assume that all distributions have full support and well defined conditional
densities that are continuously differentiable with uniformly bounded derivatives (in t, xt and θt).
A classic example of a stochastic process that satisfies these properties is the following AR(1)
process for t ≥ 1:
θt = γθt−1 + εt, (8)







This example is useful to keep in mind since it shows the general stochastic decay of the influence
of the initial type θ0 on subsequent types θt.
As in the previous section, we denote the agent’s payoff from getting the allocation xt in t is
δtut (θt, xt, pt) = δ
t (v (xt, θt)− pt) .
We assume that ut (·) is continuously differentiable and bounded in both arguments with uniformly
bounded derivatives (in t, θt, xt).
In a dynamic direct mechanism the buyer reports her type θt at each t. Letting θ
t = (θ0, ..., θt) ∈
Θt, we define a dynamic direct mechanism as {xt, pt}t≥0:
xt : Θ
t → Xt, pt : Θt → R.




= xt (θt, x
t−1). Any Markovian allocation




∣∣θt, xt (θt)) ,
and we denote this process by λ[x]. By the dynamic revelation principle in Myerson (1986), it is
without loss of generality to consider a dynamic direct mechanism where the buyer reports her type
θi,t truthfully in each t, and any such mechanism is said to be incentive compatible.
Canonical State Representation Similar to Section 3.2.3, it is possible to represent the process
λ[x] by a sequence of i.i.d. uniform random variables εt and a sequence of functions Zt such that
Zt(θt−1, x
t−1, εt) ∼ Ft
(
·
∣∣θt−1, xt−1 ) . (10)
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In this sense, we can view the process as being generated by θ0 and the increments (εt)
T
t=1 . The
advantage of this new formulation is that now the stochastic increments εt are independent of θ0 by
construction. Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014) call this the canonical representation of the Markov
process (θt)
T
t=1. The reason for using this canonical representation of the Markov process, is that
by the independence of εt relative to θ0, we can now vary θ0 while keeping the future information
structure fixed.






































Using the canonical representation (10), we can evaluate the impulse response function (12) in terms











fτ (θτ |θτ−1, xτ−1 )
 .
In order to make sure that the envelope theorem can be applied, we require that the canonical
representation be differentiable and∣∣It−1,t (θt, xt−1)∣∣ ≤ B for some B <∞.11
The impulse response function isolates the effects of the true type at t on the future evolution of θ̃s
for s > t. The other channel, i.e. through the dependence on xt and therefore indirectly on θt depends
only on the announced types in the mechanism and not the true types. The construction then
proceeds by showing that the information rents are determined by the direct effects of payoffs. As
in static allocation problem, the effects through announcements vanish by the first order condition
for optimal announcements.
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where the expectation is taken with respect to the continuation of the process λ[x] from history
(θs, xs (θs)) onwards.
Theorem 4 (Local Incentive Compatibility)
If (x, p) is incentive compatible, then for all s, θs, Vs (θ





















The allocation rule thus pins down the incentive compatible payoff up to a constant as in the
static case. To interpret the result, let




















The impulse response function measures the effect of a small change in θs on θt and ∂U∂θt measures
the induced change in period t utility. The transfers that support the indirect utility of the agent
can then be derived just as in static model.
As discussed earlier, suffi cient conditions for the optimality of the candidate mechanism given
by the local incentive conditions are much more diffi cult to obtain in the dynamic setting than in
the static setting. Even though θt is one-dimensional at each t, the resulting allocation is multi-
dimensional since reports in period t affect the allocation in all future periods. Pavan, Segal, and
Toikka (2014) offer a necessary and suffi cient condition for the implementability of the allocation
process that corresponds almost exactly to the full incentive compatibility condition 6 of Section
3.1. While the condition itself is not easy to verify, it suggests stronger notions that are easier to
verify. Their condition of strong monotonicity that holds whenever the type evolution is independent
of past allocations and all future allocations are increasing in all reported types turns out to be
particularly useful in applications.
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Relaxed solution Consider next the optimization problem of a principal that has her own dy-
namic payoffs given by
T∑
t=0
δt (pt − ct (xt)) .
She designs a mechanism to maximize her own payoff. As always, we can write the principal’s payoff
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− V0 (θ0) .
subject to the incentive compatibility conditions and the period 0 participation constraints:
V0 (θ0) ≥ 0.
We denote the first line in the objective function by Ex [S (x, θ)] to represent the social surplus.
We have built the local incentive compatibility conditions into the objective function by using the
envelope formula to represent the buyer’s information rent. Typically, the individual participation













involves dynamic programming and is not easy in general. If the process of (θt)
T
t=1 does not depend
on the allocation xt and there are no intertemporal restrictions on xt, then a pointwise solution is
often possible. If the relaxed problem allows for an explicit solution, one can check if the suffi cient
conditions for full incentive compatibility are satisfied. For the examples that we describe below,
the solution of the relaxed problem can be characterized in suffi cient detail to allow us to verify
suffi cient conditions for full incentive compatibility.
If the solution of the relaxed problem is not fully incentive compatible, little is known about the
methods for solving the problem. Even if a full solution is not possible, the necessary local incentive
compatibility conditions as expressed in the envelope formula may give some qualitative insights
about the properties of the optimal dynamic contract.
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3.4 Implications and Applications of Optimal Mechanisms
We now discuss two notable application of the optimal mechanism to specific auction and contracting
environments: (i) intertemporal licensing and (ii) irreversible sale of durable good.
3.4.1 Bandit Auctions
A single indivisible object is allocated in each period amongst n possible bidders that learn about
their true valuation for the good. The type of bidder i changes only in periods t where she is















where εi is a random variable whose distribution depends on the number of periods up to t, ni (t) ,
in which the good has been allocated to i. For some stochastic processes such as the normal learning
process outlined in Section 2.1.2, the number of observations from the process (here ni (t)) and the
current posterior mean (here θit ) form a suffi cient statistic. We can interpret the allocation process
as intertemporal licensing where the current use of the object is determined on the past and current
reports of the bidders. Notably, the assignment of the object can move back and forth between
the bidders as a function of their reports. Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014) and Bergemann and
Strack (2015) consider a revenue maximizing auction for the special case of the multi-armed bandit
model in discrete or continuous time, respectively. The effi cient allocation policy under private
information was analyzed earlier in Bergemann and Välimäki (2010).












 = 1. (16)
Hence the revenue maximization problem is now turned (again using the usual steps) into a modified
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∈ RN+ |Σixi = 1}. Stated in this form, the problem can be solved using
the dynamic allocation index, the Gittins index. Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014) verify that
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the solution satisfies the average monotonicity condition and is hence implementable. Thus, the
resulting dynamic optimal auction proceeds by finding the bidder with the highest valuation after
taking into account the handicap that is determined exclusively by the initial private information
θi0. Moreover, by (16), the impulse response function, and hence the handicap is constant in time
and determined only through the initial shock.
Kakade, Lobel, and Nazerzadeh (2013) consider a class of dynamic allocation problems that
includes the above Bandit problem. By imposing a separability condition (additive or multiplicative)
on the interaction of the initial private information and all subsequent signals, they obtain an explicit
characterization of the revenue-maximizing contract and derive transparent suffi cient conditions for
the optimal contract.
Bergemann and Strack (2015) consider general time-separable allocation problems in continuous
time. By restricting attention to problems where (i) the set of feasible allocations at time t is
independent of the history of the allocations, and (ii) the flow utility functions depends only on the
initial and current private information, they can leverage the structure of the problem to frequently
obtain closed-form solutions of the optimal contract. In the leading example of repeat sales of a
good or service, they establish that the commonly observed contract features such as flat rates, free
consumption units and two-part tariffs emerge as part of the optimal contract.
3.4.2 Selling Options
The second illustrative example is a stopping problem rather than a recurrent allocation problem.
Suppose we would like to allocate a single object among N bidders, but we can allocate it only once
and for all. Thus, the seller faces a stopping problem, and at the moment of stopping, he needs to
make a decision to whom to allocate the object. Suppose the evolution of the willingness to pay by










, εit ∼ H i (·) , i.i.d. If we set γ = 1, we are essentially dealing with the model of
Board (2007).
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The seller’s problem is thus an optimal stopping problem, and her decision in period t is whether













or to continue until t + 1 and draw a new valuation vector θt+1 = γθt + εt for the bidders. As
time progresses and t increases, the distortion relative to the planner’s solution in the allocation
diminishes.
3.5 The Role of the Markovian Environment
A feature common to almost all of the above contributions is that the private information of the
agent is represented by the current state of a one-dimensional Markov process, and that the new
information that the agent receives is controlled by the current state, and in turn, leads to a new
state of the Markov process. Now, in any model where the initial state is the current state of a
recurrent Markov process, such as in Battaglini (2005), the informativeness of the initial state about
future states is vanishing over time. With the impulse response of the initial state vanishing over
time this then implies that the allocative distortion vanishes in the long-run.
By contrast, a number of recent contributions considered the possibility that the initial private
information is about a parameter of the stochastic process itself, such as the drift or the variance
of the process. For example, Boleslavsky and Said (2013) let the initial private information of the
agent be the mean of a multiplicative random walk. This changes the impact that the initial private
information has on the future allocations. The distortions in the future allocation may now increase
over time rather than decline as in much of the earlier literature. The reason is that the influence
of the parameter of the stochastic process on the valuation may increase over time. Pavan, Segal,
and Toikka (2014) and Skrzypacz and Toikka (2015) report similar findings.12
The impulse response function in Boleslavsky and Said (2013) involves the number of past
realized upticks and downticks of the binary random walk. Bergemann and Strack (2015) consider
12This is equivalent to assuming that the private information of the agent corresponds to the state of a two-
dimensional Markov process, whose first component is constant after time zero, but influences the transitions of the
second component.
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the continuous time version of the multiplicative random walk, the geometric Brownian motion.
Interestingly, in the continuous time version, the impulse response function is simply the expected
number of upticks or downticks, which is a deterministic function of time and the initial state.
Correspondingly, the handicap factor is increasing linearly over time, and the optimal contract
prescribes a deterministic time at which the trade ends, thus suggesting a leasing contract with
fixed term length. More generally, Bergemann and Strack (2015) allow the valuation process of
the buyer to be either the arithmetic, geometric, or mean-reverting Brownian motion. Across these
classes of models, they show the allocative distortion of the revenue-maximizing contract can be
constant, decreasing, increasing or even random over time depending on the precise nature of the
private information.
4 Dynamic Populations
In this section, we consider mechanism design problems where the population of privately informed
agents changes over time. To fix ideas, we still assume that the mechanism designer is a seller
who has a fixed capacity of objects for sale. Her problem is now to find an incentive compati-
ble mechanism that maximizes her expected revenue. The model presented below can be viewed
as a generalization of the revenue management model in operations research to cover incomplete
information.
It is possible to distinguish two types of problems within this setting. In the first, the process
of arrivals for potential buyers is known at the outset. With independent private types, this model
is quite close to the applications surveyed in the last section. The dynamic pivot mechanism then
offers an individually rational and incentive compatible implementation of the effi cient allocation
rule. For the dynamic revenue maximization problems, dynamic stopping problems based on virtual
valuations of the buyers provide optimal solutions.
In the second class of models, the distribution of valuations or the process of arrivals of potential
buyers is itself unknown at the outset. The mechanism designer (and the agents in the mechanism)
learn more about the distribution of future demand from past realizations of arrivals and valuations
for the buyers. An early example of a model of this type with unknown value distributions in the
static case is Segal (2003). Gershkov and Moldovanu (2009b) points out problems that arise for
models of this type when agents arrive over time and when payments have to be made at the time
of allocation decision. We illustrate the problems that arise with a slight modification of the initial
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example that allows for correlated types.
Example: Continued with Correlation We continue to consider an auction of a single indi-
visible object between two bidders i ∈ {0, 1}. But now bidder i is present in the mechanism only in
period t = i. Hence the possible social allocation decisions are given by x ∈ {0, 1}, where the first
choice indicates allocating the object to bidder 0 in period 0 and the second indicates allocating to
bidder 1 in period 1.
The valuation of bidder 0 is θ0 ∈ [0, 1]. Bidder 1 learns her value in period 1, and θ1 ∈ {0, 1}.
The prior probability on the high type is p and we further assume that the types of the two agents
are correlated as follows:
Pr{θ1 = 1 |θ0} =
1
3





Pr{θ1 = 1 |θ0} =
2
3




Since agent 0 is present in t = 0 only, the optimal allocation is determined solely by type θ0 of
bidder 0 and it is given by:









Notice that this allocation rule is not monotone in θ0 and hence not incentive compatible for any
possible transfer rule p (θ0) . Hence we conclude that incentive compatibility and effi ciency are not
mutually possible. If we allowed agent 0 to receive and make transfers in t = 1, effi ciency would be
restored by reverting to the usual second price auction allocation and transfer rules:
p0 (θ0, θ1) = (1− x∗ (θ0)) θ1, p1 (θ0, θ1) = x∗ (θ0) θ0.
Importantly, this example also illustrates why achieving dominant strategies is not possible to
achieve in dynamic mechanisms even with unrestricted transfers. If agent 1 always reported θ1 = 1,
then the above mechanism would not be incentive compatible for agent 0. Since agent 1 has no
private information in t = 0, the requirement of periodically ex post incentive compatibility is
trivially satisfied.
Finally notice that the notion of marginal contribution of agent 0 is ambiguous in this case.
When computing the contribution of agent 0 to the social welfare, it is not clear if we should
use the expected value if allocating to 1 with the private information of agent 0 or without that
information (i.e. if only the allocational possibilities or also the information should be removed
when considering the social welfare when 0 is not present).
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Short vs. Long Lived Bidders; Observable vs. Unobservable Arrival Further distinctions
between the models are possible along several dimensions. The agents may be long-lived or short
lived as in many revenue management models. Gershkov and Moldovanu (2009a) extend the classic
revenue management models a la Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) to cover more general allocation
models with short-lived buyers. If they are long-lived, models may distinguish between that case
where their arrival is observable to the mechanism designer and where it is not. In the latter case,
the agents also maximize over the time at which they report their arrival (and type). Board and
Skrzypacz (2015) cover the case of stochastically arriving buyers that can time their purchases.
Gershkov, Moldovanu, and Strack (2017) develops a revenue maximizing model where the arrival
rates of the buyers over time are initially uncertain and must be learned over time.
The key to solving this type of revenue maximization problems is to find the appropriate ex-
ternality payment mechanism for the problem at hand where virtual valuations are used instead of
the true valuations. Hence the exercises are closely related in the spirit to the classical Myerson
auctions and the techniques are familiar from the previous section of this survey. The key first
step is to express the payoff to the agents using an envelope formula and then make sure that the
model has enough monotonicity to ensure full incentive compatibility of the solution of the relaxed
problem. In the case where the agents time their reporting to the mechanism designer strategically,
an additional constraint of monotonicity with respect to reporting time must also be verified. It
is interesting to note that strategic timing by the agents ends up enhancing the revenue accruing
to the seller in the optimal mechanisms in Board and Skrzypacz (2015) and Gershkov, Moldovanu,
and Strack (2017).
Finally, Garrett (2016) considers a model where the type of the agent changes stochastically,
providing an additional reason for the strategic timing of reporting one’s arrival. By analyzing the
optimal commitment paths for prices, Garrett (2016) provides a new rationale for fluctuating prices
even in otherwise completely stationary models.
5 Connections to Nearby Models
In this section, we discuss briefly two classes of dynamic contracting models that do not assume
quasi-linear payoffs. Since Rogerson (1985), models of dynamic moral hazard have discussed the
smoothing of dynamic risks in models with incentive problems. In dynamic settings, the distinction
between dynamic moral hazard and adverse selection is almost impossible to make and many models
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that share the informational structure with our general dynamic model have been discussed under
the name of dynamic moral hazard (see for example the early formulations in Thomas and Worrall
(1988), and Phelan and Townsend (1991)). The key difference between these models and those
discussed in the previous sections is that with risk averse preferences, the trade-off between effi cient
physical allocation and effi cient risk allocation emerges. In the first subsection, we discuss briefly
the models employed in new public finance from this viewpoint.
In models of financial economics, a key assumption is that the privately informed managers
do not have suffi cient funds to buy the entire enterprise. This is typically formalized through a
limited liability constraint stating that managers (the agent) cannot make payoffs to owners (the
principal). Recent work starting with Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), DeMarzo and Sannikov
(2006), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), and Biais, Mariotti, Plantin, and Rochet (2007) has analyzed
the problem of incentivizing a manager that observes privately the cash flow of a firm. In the second
subsection, we describe how the model and the results in this model compare to the results from
the general dynamic model in this survey.
5.1 New Public Finance: Risk-Averse Agent
In most mechanism design problems, the key problem for the designer can be formulated as follows:
what is the most advantageous way of providing the agent with a fixed level of utility v. With risk-
averse agents and a risk-neutral principal, optimal contracts provide some amount of insurance, but
incentive compatibility precludes the possibility of full insurance.
In dynamic problems, the principle of dynamic programming suggests that this question should















is induced for the
future. The idea is to give relatively high consumption to the agent in the periods where marginal
utility from consumption is high, but to preserve incentive compatibility, this must come at the
cost of lower continuation payoffs. Spear and Srivastava (1987) were the first to use this recursive
formulation for dynamic incentive provision: all the agent needs to know about the consequences
of her reports at each point in time are their payoff consequences and by the principle of dynamic
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t−1) , p (θt, θt−1) , θt)+ δw (θt, θt−1) ≥ u (x (θ′t, θt−1) , p (θ′t, θt−1) , θt)+ δw (θ′t, θt−1)
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t−1) , p (θt, θt−1) , θt)+ δw (θt, θt−1) ∣∣θt−1, xt−1 ],
for all t, θt−1.
The first of these constraints is the usual incentive compatibility constraint that we encountered
earlier in sequence form with the quasi-linear utilities and the second one is called the promise
keeping constraint that makes sure that the promised utilities are realized through the allocation
decisions for truthful reports.
The literature on optimal risk allocation over time has focused on two types of results. The
first is a quite striking and initially counterintuitive finding. Consider a risk-neutral principal with
a linear cost of providing consumption xt ≥ 0 to a privately informed agent. The objective of the
principal is to minimize the cost of providing an initial payoffof v to the agent. The periodic income
of the agent income is her private information θt, her type, which is assumed to be an i.i.d. draw
θt ∼ F (·) in all periods. Her payoff is given by a continuous and strictly concave utility function
u (x) that is unbounded from below. The famous immiseration result by Thomas and Worrall
(1990) states that along the optimal consumption path, we have almost surely xt → 0 and therefore
u (xt) → −∞. This result is also shown by Atkenson and Lucas (1992) to hold for a utilitarian
social planner operating subject to an aggregate feasibility constraint.14
To understand this result, note that the concavity in the utility function makes the threat
of low future consumptions an effective way of delivering incentives for current reports. A low
current θt is associated with a relatively high current consumption xt, and to preserve incentive
compatibility, this must be associated with a relatively low future payoff. A simple variational
argument establishes that the marginal cost for the principal for providing promised utility v must
be a martingale. The martingale convergence theorem establishes the convergence of this marginal
cost. Promised utilities cannot converge to a finite constant since this would result in optimal full
insurance within period contradicting incentive compatibility (with constant future promises) and
the result follows.
The second key result is the inverse Euler equation for the provision of consumption. Rogerson
(1985) considers the optimal contracting problem between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse
agent choosing an unobservable action (and no private information). One of the key findings in
14Feasible allocations are constrained by the endowment process in an exchange economy.
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Notice that the terms in this formula are the inverses of the lhs and the rhs of the usual Euler





is determined based on the reported types as long as current utility does
not depend on θt. In the literature on dynamic public finance, monetary transfers are not present,














, where c denotes the consumption
and l denotes the labor supply. If u (x, θ) takes the form
u (x, θ) = v (x)− g (l, θ) ,
the inverse Euler equation for the consumption allocations holds as shown in Golosov, Kocherlakota,
and Tsyvinski (2003). By Jensen’s inequality, one sees immediately that if the agent is allowed to




. This observation has
given rise to the large literature on optimal contracting with hidden savings. (We should include
some references here).
The immiseration results have led to a reconsideration of the assumption of full commitment on
the two sides of the contracting problem. Assuming that the outside option of the agent is increasing
in her current type leads to a new qualitative feature in the optimal contract. As observed by Harris
and Holmstrom (1982) and Kocherlakota (1996), without commitment, the promised utility in the
contract moves upward over time as higher and higher types are reached.
An alternative approach is taken in Farhi andWerning (2007), where the planner discounts future
periods less than the generation born in the initial period. This consideration for intergenerational
distribution leads to solutions that often generate optimal income distributions that do not converge
towards the immiseration outcome.
If one assumes that the set of possible types is a connected interval and that the process of types
has full support, then the Bellman equation of the agent can be written as:
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Integration by parts gives:
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In other words, a similar envelope theorem characterization for the agent’s utility is still possible
in this model. The next step of substituting the agent’s payoff into the principal’s objective unfor-
tunately fails because of the lack of quasi-linear utility. As a result, solving the model is in general
more diffi cult than in the quasi-linear case and numerical methods are typically needed. This also
implies that checking full incentive compatibility becomes much harder in this class of models.
5.2 Limited Liability
In financial economics, a key incentive problem is between a privately informed manager (agent)
and an uninformed owner (principal). Limited liability protection on part of the agent implies
an upper bound on the transfers that can be made from the agent to the principal. Often this
constraint takes the form that all transfers must be from the principal to the agent. This prevents
of course the principal from selling the enterprise to the agent at the outset. Since recent surveys of
this large literature exist (see for example Biais, Mariotti, and Rochet (2013)), we do not attempt
a comprehensive survey of the topic.
A recent paper Krasikov and Lamba (2016) takes up a particular quasilinear version of our
general dynamic model with the added feature of limited liability. In a two-state Markov chain model
of information for their model, they consider optimal contracting between a principal and a manager
that knows her private cost type. The restriction to a binary type set allows Krasikov and Lamba
(2016) to solve fully the optimal contract using techniques similar to Battaglini (2005). Echoing the
results from earlier papers in dynamic mechanism design, the paper shows that the optimal contract
converges eventually to the effi cient static contract. Prior to the path of reaching this region, the
contract displays various types of ineffi ciencies reflecting the limited liability constraints as well as
distortions arising from the principal’s attempt to extract information rent from the agent.
We believe that a lot of work still remains in the analysis of the risk-neutral setting with
additional contractual limitations imposed on the problems. Partial verifiability as in the case
of a manager that cannot exaggerate the cash flow of her firm and limited liability constraints are
good starting points for this analysis. More work is also needed towards a better understanding of
ex post participation constraints.
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5.3 Bounding the Performance of Mechanisms
The intertemporal allocations and commitments that resulted from the dynamic mechanism bal-
anced trade-offs over time. These trade-offs were based on the expectations of the agents and the
principal over the future states. In this sense, all of the mechanisms considered were Bayesian
solutions and relied on a shared and common prior of all participating players. Yet, this clearly is a
strong assumption and a natural question would be to what extent weaker informational assump-
tions, and corresponding solution concepts, could provide new insights to the format of dynamic
mechanisms. For example, the sponsored search auctions which provide much of the revenue for the
search engines on the web, are clearly repeated and dynamic allocations with private information,
yet, most of the allocations and transfer are determined by spot markets rather than long-term
contracts. An important question then is why not more transactions are governed by long-term
arrangements that could presumably share the effi ciency gains from less distortionary allocations
between the buyers and the seller. An important friction to long-term arrangements is presumably
the diversity in expectations about future events between buyer and seller. In a recent paper, Mir-
rokni, Leme, Tang, and Zuo (2017) provide lower bounds for a revenue maximizing mechanism in
which the players do not have to agree on their future expectations. The mechanism that achieves
the lower bound in fact satisfies the interim participation and incentive constraints for all possible re-
alizations of future states. This approach reflects the recent interest of theoretical computer science
in dynamic mechanism design, see for example Papadimitriou, Pierrakos, Psomas, and Rubinstein
(2016), and mechanism design more generally. But in contrast to the approach most commonly
taken by economic theory who attempt to explicitly identify and design the optimal mechanism,
theoretical computer science often describes achievable bounds on the performance. The bounds are
frequently achieved by mechanisms that have computational advantages in terms of computational
complexity relative to the, possible unknown, exact optimal mechanism.
6 Concluding Remarks
It was our objective to present some of the recent work on dynamic mechanism design. We hope we
have conveyed the scope and the progress that has been made in the past decade. Our discussion
should have also indicated that many interesting questions remain wide open. We shall describe
some of them in these final remarks.
We argued that the optimal dynamic mechanism allows the seller to receive a large share of the
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surplus by replacing the sequence of periodic, and hence static and ex post participation constraints,
by a single ex ante participation constraints. We discussed above that an important friction to
long-term arrangements is presumably the diversity in expectations about future events among
the players. Here, a natural direction is to ask to what extent the insights from static mechanism
design can be transferred to dynamic settings. Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) establish that in
static environments the revenue maximizing allocation can frequently be implemented by dominant
rather than Bayesian incentive compatible strategies. Similarly, Bergemann and Morris (2005)
present conditions for static social choice functions under which an allocation can be implemented
for all possible interim beliefs that the agents may hold. The robustness to private information is
arguably an even more important consideration in dynamic environments.
The central problem that the literature of dynamic mechanism has addressed is how to provide
incentives to report the sequentially arriving private information. Thus, the central constraints on
the design are given by the sequence of interim incentive compatibility conditions. The participation
constraints on the other hand have, perhaps surprisingly for a dynamic environment, have received
much less attention. Now, sometimes a dynamic mechanism can guarantee the ex-ante participation
constraints as well as the interim (or periodic) ex-post constraints. The dynamic pivot mechanism
that governed the dynamically effi cient allocation provided such an instance. By contrast, the
dynamic revenue maximization contract only imposed the participation constraint at time zero, thus
ex-ante relative to all future arriving private information. In particular, the dynamic mechanism
cannot provide any guarantees about ex post participation constraints. Indeed, Krähmer and
Strausz (2015) show that sequential screening frequently reduces to a static screening solution
if the seller has to meet the ex post rather than the ex ante participation constraints of the buyers.
Moreover, if the dynamic mechanism improves upon a static mechanism in the sequential screening
model, then the ex post participation constraint severely limits the ability of the seller to extract
surplus through option contracts as shown in Bergemann, Castro, and Weintraub (2017).
A related but distinct issue that is likely to require more analysis is the timing of the contractual
agreement between principal and agents. Much of the current analysis assumes that the arrival of
the agents is known to the principal and that the principal can make a single, take-it-or-leave-it offer
at the moment of the agent’s arrival. This constraint, while natural in a static setting, is much less
plausible in dynamic settings. In particular, it explicitly excludes the possibility for the agent to
postpone and delay the acceptance decision to a later time when he may have additional information
about the value of the contract offered to him. A notable exception is Garrett (2016) who allows
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for the random arrival of buyers and suggests that it may offer an explanation for temporary price
reduction even in an otherwise stationary environment. The participation constraints may impose
important constraints on the principal either because the agents may arrive over time and the
arrival time may be private information to the agent, or because the principal lacks in commitment
power relative to future offers. For example, Lobel and Paes Leme (2017) assume that the seller
can make future commitments to the current buyer, yet the seller is unable to commit to future
offers that he will make to newly arriving buyers. The resulting inability to preclude future, and
possibly more favorable offers, presents a new option to the current buyer, and hence strengthens
his bargaining position, and limits the ability of the seller to extract surplus. Bergemann and Strack
(2017) analyze the dynamic revenue maximizing contract subject to the restriction that the seller
has to offer a stationary contract. Thus the seller is forced to renew the contract offer in every
period, both to newly arriving and currently waiting customers. They show that the ability to
postpone the acceptance of an offer to a future period can increase the value of the buyer and can
lead to a more effi cient allocation resulting in equilibrium.
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